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Splitting the Baby in Two:
How to Solve Solomon’s Dilemma
when Agents are Boundedly Rational
Giovanni Ponti
Abstract
We study the dynamic implementation of the first-best for King Solomon’s
Dilemma, on the assumption that boundedly rational players find their
way to equilibrium using monotonic evolutionary dynamics, and also with
best-reply dynamics. We find that, although the mechanisms proposed by
the literature are dynamically implementable with best-reply dynamics,
the same does not hold when monotonic dynamics are considered. To
solve this problem, we propose an alternative mechanism, whose game-
form is still implementable in the traditional sense. However, it is also
dynamically implementable, as every interior path of the adjustment pro-
cesses we consider converges to the first-best, which is also asymptotically
stable.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C72, D78, D83.
KEYWORDS: Solomon’s Dilemma, Implementation Theory, Evolutionary Dy-
namics.
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1 Introduction
King Solomon is called to resolve a dispute between two women, “Anna” and
“Betta”, who both claim to be the mother of a baby. In economic terms, an
indivisible prize is to be allocated between two individuals who holds different
evaluations. The identity of the true mother (i.e. the agent with the highest
evaluation) is common knowledge between Anna and Betta, but unknown to
Solomon, whose objective is to rightfully resolve the dispute at no cost for the
true mother.
To solve this dilemma, Glazer and Ma [9] propose the simple mechanism
sketched in Figure 1, to be used when there are only two feasible evaluations, v
and v¯, with v < v¯.
Player 1 says:
Baby is given to 2"hers"
"mine"
STAGE
1
2 Player 2 says:
Baby is given to 1"hers"
"mine" 2 pays v and gets the baby 
1 pays d
Figure 1
Glazer and Ma’s mechanism (M1)
Denote by vi ∈ {v, v¯}; i = A,B, i’s evaluation. According to the game-form
of Figure 1 (labeled as “M1” in what follows), Betta and Anna sequentially
announce the identity of the true mother. The mechanism is designed in such
a way that a statement in which Anna (Betta) attributes the baby to Betta
(Anna) is never challenged. If both claim to be the true mother, then the baby
is given to the player who has been chosen to speak last, subject to a lump-sum
transfer to Solomon whose utility value, v, lies somewhere in between the two
evaluations (i. e. v < v < v¯).1
It is not difficult to show that M1 implements the first-best when subgame
perfection is employed as equilibrium notion. To see why, assume (without loss
of generality) that Betta is the true mother (i.e. vA = v < v¯ = vB ) and evaluate
1Under this circumstance, also the “looser” pays Solomon a fine, – > 0.
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the optimal course of action for player 2.2 Since vB > v > vA, only Betta (given
she has been chosen to speak last) has an incentive to claim (only her evaluation
exceeds the transfer). This, in turn, implies that the unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism requires Anna to attribute
the baby to Betta. This outcome does not depend on the order in which the
two mothers are called to speak: if Anna is player 2, she has no direct incentive
to claim (vA < v); if Anna is player 1, she is better off by not claiming to avoid
the fine (since Betta, given vB > v, will claim in return).
However, the game induced by this mechanism has many other “social inef-
ficient” Nash equilibria. In particular, there is a component (i.e. a closed and
connected set) of Nash equilibria in which Betta, conditional on being selected
to speak first, gives up the baby under the (“incredible”) threat that Anna will
challenge in return (leaving Betta without the baby and with a fine to pay).3
Thus, to ensure that the first-best is achieved by way of M1, we need to as-
sume that both mothers are rational (in the sense that they would never use a
dominated action), and they know that their opponent is also rational.
Whether this is to be considered as a demanding assumption is, essentially,
an empirical matter. In this respect, there is already substantial experimental
evidence that casts doubts on the use of standard game-theoretic equilibrium
notions to describe how people play games in the lab. What we learn from
experiments is that subjects often fail to play the equilibrium, especially if
the equilibrium notion is fairly refined (as is the case of subgame perfection).4
Better results are observed when subjects can acquire some experience through
repeated play.5 However, for some games, players may still fail to play an
equilibrium, even with experience. As for the specific allocation problem studied
here, Elbittar and Kagel [5] have done experiments with Moore’s [13] and Perry
and Reny’s [16] mechanisms to solve Solomon’s Dilemma.6 Although their study
appears inconclusive in isolating a unique behavioral pattern from the various
experimental sessions, what stands clear from the experiments is that “...the
emergence of non-expected responses in the experimental sessions makes both
mechanisms fail in their predictions...” (p. 44).
Prompted by these experimental findings, we approach Solomon’s dilemma
taking bounded rationality into account. The underlying theory is based upon
an alternative definition of implementation. Among the variables which specify
2In what follows, we shall always associate Betta with the role of the agent with the higher
evaluation (i.e. the “true mother”). As for players’ positions are concerned, we adopt the
convention of labeling as player k, k = 1, 2, the one who is required to move at stage k.
3This threat is to be consider “incredible” in the spirit of subgame-perfection insofar, by
claiming the baby, Anna would choose a dominated action.
4See McKelvey and Palfrey [12] and Binmore et al. [2].
5See Gu¨th et al. [10] and Cooper et al. [4].
6Moore’s [13] mechanism is a modification of GMM. Perry and Reny’s [16] mechanism
employs the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies and is supposed to be used in
presence of incomplete information of the agents’ evaluations. As shown in Ponti [17], failure
of monotonic dynamic implementation can be proved also for these mechanisms.
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the “environment” in which the mechanism is supposed to operate, this defini-
tion includes the learning protocols agents may use, as well as initial conditions
of the learning process. According to this alternative approach, a social choice
rule will be said to be dynamically implemented by a mechanism if, for all pos-
sible environments (i.e. preferences, adjustment processes, initial conditions),
the limiting set of outcomes i) coincides with the the first-best and ii) is also
asymptotically stable, that is, robust to arbitrarily small perturbations.7
As for the dynamic implementation of the mechanism of M1, Proposition
1 shows that if the learning dynamics satisfy Nachbar’s [14] monotonicity con-
dition, then many equilibria in the inefficient Nash equilibrium component can
be limit points of the adjustment process. In other words, Betta’s incredible
threat can be sustainable if, in the first repetitions of the game, it is exercised
sufficiently often.8 However, as Proposition 1 shows, both mechanisms pass
the stability test, that is, for initial conditions starting sufficiently close to the
first-best, both mechanisms display the desired stability properties. We also
study the dynamic implementation problem under best-reply dynamics (Mat-
sui [11]), a limiting case of monotonic dynamic by which only strategies that
are a best response to the current mixed strategy profile grow. This choice of
dynamics allows us to understand the effects of increasing levels of responsive-
ness to past payoffs of the players (which could be interpreted as a proxy for
“sophistication”) on the performance of the mechanism. In this respect, we
find (proposition 2) that under best-reply dynamics the mechanism of figure 1
dynamically implements the first-best. Rather than accepting such a drastic
restriction in the domain of admissible learning environments, we look for an
alternative mechanism which may solve this problem.
There is a caveat here. Implicit in our evolutionary approach there is the
restriction of the set of admissible preference relations to those preferences that
can be represented as VNM utility functions. This restriction is standard in
many fields of economics (game theory included), although it is an unusual
assumption for implementation theory. This is because mechanisms usually
employ pure strategy equilibria and need no assumptions on the agents’ prefer-
ences under risk. The reason why we use VNM utility functions is essentially
technical, that is, we need to specify the payoff functions for mixed strategies,
as dynamics are defined over the mixed strategy space. However, given this
restriction, why should not Solomon exploit the fact that agents’ behavior must
be consistent with VNM axiomatization to achieve his goal?
Consider the game-form of figure 2.
7Cabrales and Ponti (forthcoming) discuss in detail the rationale behind this alternative
approach.
8The sustainability of incredible threats under evolutionary dynamics was first pointed out,
by way of simulation, by Gale al. [7] for the Ultimatum Game.
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Player 1 says:
Baby is given to 2"hers"
"mine"
STAGE
1
2
"hers"
Player 2 says:
"mine"
Baby is given to 1
2 pays v and gets the baby 
with prob. p
with prob. 1-p
1 pays v and gets the baby 
2  pays nothing
1  pays nothing
Figure 2
Our proposed solution (M2)
According to the biblical story, Solomon was able to solve the dilemma by
threatening to “split the baby in two”. By adopting M2, Solomon can still
achieve his goal by introducing a lottery in which splitting occurs only “in
expected terms”, with no risk of blood being spilled.9 Since the game induced
by M2 is strictly dominance solvable, it is also dynamically implementable with
monotonic dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. The implementation
problem with monotonic dynamics and two feasible evaluations is solved in
section 2, while section 3 deals with best-reply dynamics. Section 4 extends
the above result to the N -player case, while section 5 concludes, followed by an
appendix which collects the proofs.
2 Monotonic Dynamics
For a given normalform game G = {I, Si, ui}, denote by xi = {xsii }, si ∈ Si,
a generic mixed strategy for player i. We formalize players’ behavior in terms
of the mixed strategy profile x(t) ≡ (xA(t), xB(t)) ∈ ∆ played at each point
in time, with ∆0 denoting the relative interior of the state space ∆, i.e. the
set of completely mixed strategy profiles. The evolution of x(t) is given by the
following system of continuous-time differential equations:
9Although non standard, the use of lotteries is not new in the implementation literature
(see, e.g., [8], [1] and [16]).
6
x˙sii = f
si
i ((x(t)); i = A,B, (1)
with
∑
si∈Si f
si
i ((x(t)) = 0.
As we explained in the introduction, we shall use asymptotic stability with
respect to the interior as a sufficient condition (together with global interior con-
vergence) for the first-best outcome to be dynamically implementable.10 As for
the relation between the evolutionary dynamics and game payoffs, this section
focuses on solutions of (1) which satisfy the following condition.
Assumption 1 (Monotonic Dynamics.) A selection dynamic (1) is called
payoff monotonic if
i) growth rates gsi (x(t)) ≡ x˙
s
i (t)
xsi (t)
are Lipschitz continuous in an open domain X
containing ∆;
ii) for all si, s
′
i ∈ Si and all x−i ∈ ∆−i,
sign[gsii (x(t))− gs
′
i
i (x(t))] = sign[ui(si, x−i(t))− ui(s′i, x−i(t))], (2)
where ui(., .) denotes player i’s (VNM) payoff function.
Firstly introduced by Nachbar [14], condition (2) is commonly used in the
evolutionary literature to capture the essence of a selective process. Given the
mixed strategy profile played at each point in time, strategies with higher ex-
pected payoff grow faster than poorly performing ones.
For the dynamic analysis of the two mechanisms presented in the introduc-
tion, we shall focus on the case in which v¯ = vB (i.e. the true mother is Betta),
and denote by G (Γ) the game induced by the mechanism of figure 1(2).
For both games, a pure strategy si ∈ Si is an ordered pair (h, k);h, k ∈
{A,B} of messages concerning the identity of the true mother. Each message is
to be used in one of the two subgames, G1 (Γ1), in which Anna speaks first, and
G2 (Γ2), in which Betta speaks first. The evolutionary properties of the two
games will be derived using a two-population model (one population of Annas
and one population of Bettas). The implicit assumption is that agents from
each population are randomly paired; which action is to be used depends on the
order of statements, which is randomly determined (by tossing a “fair” coin) by
the matching technology.11
Proposition 1 If repeated play evolves according to monotonic dynamics, then
the first-best i)fails to be dynamically implemented by the mechanism of figure
1, although ii) it can be dynamically implemented by the mechanism of figure 2.
10By interior asymptotic stability, every trajectory starting arbitrarily close stays sufficiently
close and eventually converges to the solution. By interior global convergence, every interior
trajectory converges to the first-best. For formal definitions, see Weibull [21].
11In other words, we use the “symmetrization procedure” of the strategy space proposed by
Selten [19]. Clearly, Selten’s symmetrization acts only on strategies, not on payoffs, as players
hold different evaluations concerning the event they are given the prize.
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Proof. In the Appendix.
3 Best-Reply dynamics
In this section, we shall consider an alternative scenario.
Assumption 2 (Best-Reply Dynamics.) A selection dynamic (1) is called
best-reply dynamics if x(t) evolves as follows:
x˙ = BR(x)− x, (3)
with BR(x) denoting the mixed strategy best-reply correspondence BR : ∆ 7→ ∆.
This alternative dynamic defines a (continuous-time) version of the classic
best-reply dynamics, often proposed as an alternative learning model to the
evolutionary dynamics studied hereto. We can give two interpretations to (3).
Following Matsui [11], we can use (3) to approximate the evolution of an infinite
population of players who occasionally update their strategy, selecting a best
reply to the current population state x(t). Alternatively, (3) can be regarded as
the continuous-time limit (up to a reparametrization of time) of the well known
fictitious play dynamic.12 This dynamic accounts for the evolution of players’
beliefs, when these beliefs follow the empirical frequencies with which each pure
strategy profile has been played (and perfectly observed) in the past, and agents
select, at each point in time, a pure strategy among those which maximize their
expected payoff, given their current beliefs.
Proposition 2 If repeated play evolves according to the best-reply dynamic,
then the first-best can be dynamically implemented by both mechanisms of figures
1 and 2.
Proof. In the Appendix.
As for best-reply dynamics, we have shown that every interior solution con-
verges to the unique equilibrium whose outcome is what Solomon wants. This
is so because every interior solution of (3) has the property that weakly dom-
inated strategies in which players lie about their own evaluation in stage 2
are played with vanishing weight. In other words, under best-reply dynamics,
these incredible threats are not sustainable, and this implies convergence to the
(subgame-perfect) solution.
12Firstly introduced by Brown [3] as an algorithm to compute Nash equilibria, fictitious
play has been recently re-interpreted as a learning model in the by Fudenberg and Kreps [6].
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4 Some extensions and negative results
All the results hereto depend on the assumption that there are only two players
and two possible evaluations (i.e. Solomon knows what is the highest evalu-
ation). As it turns out, the latter restriction can be easily relaxed when the
implementation problem is to be solved dynamically, while the former is crucial
to obtain the result.
4.1 Multiple evaluations
Assume Anna’s and Betta’s evaluations vA and vB (vA < vB) are drawn from
the finite set V ≡ {vk}Kk=1; vk > 0.
Moore’s [13] proposed solution to Solomon’s Dilemma for the case of (finite)
multiple evaluations is sketched in figure 3.
Player 2 says:
Baby is given to 1"hers"
places a bid  
STAGE
2
3
Player 1 pays d and
"does not match"  2 pays        and gets the baby
2 pays d
"matches"
2p
2p
 1 pays        and gets the baby2p
Figure 3
Multiple evaluations: Moore’s [13] mechanism.
Stage 1 is identical to that of figure 1. If player 2 does not give up the prize
in stage 2, she has to post the price pi2 ∈ V she is willing to pay to get it. Then,
player 1 (after having paid a fixed fine, δ) has to decide whether she want to
match the bid. If she matches, she pays pi2 and gets the prize.
13 Otherwise, the
prize is given to player 2.
It is not difficult to show that also the mechanism of figure 3, although
subgame-perfect implementable, fails to be dynamically implementable under
monotonic dynamics. This is because player 1 (regardless of whether she holds
the highest evaluation) can always play a (Nash equilibrium) strategy by which
she claims the prize at stage 1, and matches whatever bid at stage 3. If this
(weakly dominated) strategy is played with sufficiently high probability, nothing
can prevent the system to converge to a Nash equilibrium in which player 2 gives
13In this case, also player 2 has to pay Solomon the fine, δ.
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up the prize, no matter how “credible” is the threat she is facing. However,
this feature of the mechanism does not affect its dynamic implementation, if
we restrict the class of learning environments to best-reply dynamics. This is
because, if initial conditions are in the relative interior of the mixed strategy
space, weakly dominated “threats” will be played with vanishing probability, so
as to force Anna to give up the prize in the stage which precedes the bidding
phase.
It is important to note that this difficulty is not peculiar of Moore’s [13]
mechanism, but intrinsic to the fact that Solomon does not know what the
highest evaluation is. In this case, the mechanism must employ a bidding stage
in which players make statements about their own evaluation. If this bidding
stage is arranged after (or is simultaneous to) the phase in which players may
give up the prize, then:
a) if loosing the auction yields a punishment, like in [13], then there exist reach-
able Nash equilibria by which Anna bids over Betta’s evaluation and Betta gives
up the prize to avoid the fine;14
b) if loosing the auction does not yield a punishment, then Anna has no incentive
to withdraw, since bidding their true evaluation is a weakly dominant strategy
for both players.
Things are similar if the bidding stage is arranged before the stage in which
players can attribute the prize to their opponent (as is for the mechanism pro-
posed by Perry and Reny [16]). In this case, the first-best would be achieved
when Anna wins the auction and then withdraws. However:
a) if loosing the auction (when the winner does not exercise her option to with-
draw) yields a punishment, then there exist reachable Nash equilibria in which
Anna bids over Betta’s evaluation and Betta bids even higher and then with-
draws;
b) if loosing the auction does not yield a punishment, then Anna has an incentive
to bid her true value and to stick on it (as this strategy weakly dominates any
strategy in the support of the first-best outcome).
Can a lottery solve this problem, as in the two-evaluation case? The answer
is no. Since Solomon does not know what the highest evaluation is, he cannot
construct a lottery with a strictly positive (negative) expected value for Betta
(Anna).15
We conclude this section by observing that, to construct our model, we had
to assume two populations (one population of Annas and one population of
Bettas). To make sense of the model, even when agents may differ in their
private evaluation, there must exist two disjoint sets of feasible evaluations,
14It can be proved that this feature does not depend on how this bidding stage is arranged.
15The same result holds if the lottery depends upon the bidding stage. If the discriminatory
value is determined as (an ² above) the lowest bid (like in a second price auction), there is
no incentive for either player to withdraw; if this discriminatory price is determined by (an ²
below) the highest bid (like in a first price auction), the mechanism suffers the same problems
as Moore’s [13].
10
whose ranges do not overlap. Incidentally, this is the only information Solomon
needs to know to set up a lottery which, as in the two-evaluation case, has a
strictly positive (negative) expected value for the high (low) evaluation player.
4.2 Two evaluations, multiple players
Let us assume that there are N populations of agents (1 population of Bettas
and N − 1 populations of Annas), repeatedly engaged in the N − player version
of Solomon’s dilemma. In this case, there is an easy way to implement the first-
best dynamically, by way of the following mechanism. Each player is arranged
to simultaneously announce whether to claim the prize or not. If a player does
not claim, her payoff is zero, unless no other player claims, in which case a fine
δ > 0 is levied to all. If some player claims, a lottery is drawn which assign
the prize among the claimants (each of which has some positive probability of
winning), in exchange to a side payment equal to v. To see why this mechanism
can implement the first best dynamically with both monotonic and best-reply
dynamics, notice that the underlying game is strictly dominance solvable. This
is because claiming is a strictly dominant strategy for Betta; if Betta claims the
prize, then not claiming is strictly optimal for all the N − 1 players in Anna’s
position. In consequence, standard results can be used to show that the first-
best can be dynamically implemented in both the learning environments we
consider.
5 Conclusion
In the recent years, there has been an impressive progress in the theory of
implementation. We are now in possess of a wide variety of instruments, by
which, “...with enough ingenuity, the planner can implement ‘anything’ ”16.
We can identify (at least) two sources of ingenuity:
• agents are assumed to play by the book, i.e. to follow the rules of the
mechanism in any possible circumstance;
• they are also assumed to play the equilibrium prescribed by the social
rule.
Although it has been developed for a very specific allocation problem (and,
therefore, lacks of the generality typical of the implementation literature), our
result move in the direction of a substantial relaxation of the second set of
assumptions. If Solomon is “patient” enough, so as to accept the fact that it
might take some time to achieve his goal, he may exploit the dynamic features
of the equilibrating process to make sure that the first-best will be eventually
attained.
16See Sjo¨stro¨m [20].
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Whether the learning environments we explore capture the essence of real-life
bounded rationality is, essentially, an empirical matter. In this respect, there is
already some experimental evidence on the specific allocation problem we study
in this paper which substantially supports the thesis that traditional implemen-
tation techniques may poorly perform in laboratory, as they do not adequately
consider the effects of disequilibrium play. Elbittar and Kagel [5] have done ex-
periments with Moore’s [13] and Perry and Reny’s [16] mechanisms. Although
their study appears inconclusive in isolating a unique behavioral pattern from
the various experimental sessions, what stands clear from the experiments is
that “...the emergence of non-expected responses in the experimental sessions
makes both mechanisms fail in their predictions...” (p. 44). The extent to which
our proposed solutions may correct these deficiencies is left to future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Some useful results
The formal analysis developed in this paper is based on results, some of those
are proved elsewhere. The aim of this section is to provide the reader with a
quick reference of these theoretical findings.
Lemma 1 Let G ≡ {{A,B}, Si, ui} denote a two-player normalform game. If
there exists some Nash equilibrium s∗ ≡ (s∗i , s∗−i) such that i) s∗i is a weakly
dominant strategy for player i and ii) s∗−i is a strict best response to s
∗
i , then
1. s∗ is contained in a Nash equilibrium component which is interior asymptot-
ically stable under any monotonic dynamic (2).
2. s∗ is interior asymptotically stable under best-reply dynamics (3).
Proof.
1. See Oechssler and Schlag [15], Proposition 1.
2. Since s∗i is a weakly dominant strategy, it must be x˙
s∗i
i = 1 − xs
∗
i
i for any
interior solution of (3). Moreover, since s∗−i is a strict best response to s
∗
i , there
must exist some ² > 0 such that s∗−i is the unique best response for any xi such
that x
s∗i
i ≥ 1− ². This also implies that there exists a closed neighborhood B(²)
of s∗ such that:
i) trajectories starting from B(²)∩∆0 do not leave B(²)∩∆0 (i.e. s∗ is stable);
ii) trajectories starting from B(²)∩∆0 converge to s∗ (i.e. s∗ is interior attract-
ing).
Since these two requirements characterize interior asymptotic stability, the re-
sult follows.
Definition 1 (τ -dominance) Let x(x(0), t) be an interior solution of (1). A
pure strategy si is said to be strictly τ -dominated by some pure strategy s
′
i(
si <τ s
′
i hereafter) if we can identify a time τ and a non-empty compact set C−i
for which:
x−i(t) ∈ C−i, ∀t > τ ; (4)
ui(si, x−i) < ui(s′i, x−i), ∀x−i ∈ C−i. (5)
Moreover, si is weakly τ -dominated by s
′
i(si ≤τ s′i hereafter) if (4) holds and
(5) is replaced by the following conditions:
ui(si, x−i) ≤ ui(s′i, x−i), ∀x−i ∈ C−i, (6)
ui(si, x−i) < ui(s′i, x−i), ∀x−i ∈ C0−i, (7)
where, by analogy, C0−i = C−i ∩∆0.
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Corollary 1 If si is strictly (weakly) dominated by s
′
i, then si <τ s
′
i (si ≤τ s′i).
Proof. Fix τ = 0 and C−i = ∆−i.
Let ωi(x(0))be the ω-limit set for player i of an interior solution x(x(0), t),
i.e. ωi(x(0)) = {xˆi : xi(x(0), t) → xˆi for some sequence 〈tm〉∞m=1}.
Lemma 2 Let x(x(0), t) be an interior solution of a monotonic dynamic x˙ =
f(x). If si ≤τ s′i then
1. ddt
x
si
i
x
s′
i
i
< 0 for any t > τ .
2. Limt→∞
x
si
i
x
s′
i
i
= L
(si,s
′
i)
i ≥ 0.
3. If L
(si,s
′
i)
i > 0 then ui(si, x−i) = ui(s
′
i, x−i),∀x−i ∈ ω−i(x(0)).
Proof. See Ponti [18], Proposition 4.1.
Lemma 3 Let x(x(0), t) be an interior solution of a monotonic dynamic x˙ =
f(x). If si <τ s
′
i then xˆ
si
i ≡ limt→∞ xsii = 0.
Proof. See Ponti [18], Proposition 4.2.
Lemma 4 Let x(x(0), t) be an interior solution of the best-reply dynamics (3).
If si ≤τ s′i (si <τ s′i), then limt→∞ xsii = 0.
Proof. If si ≤τ s′i (and, a fortiori, if si <τ s′i), then (3) implies
x˙si (t) = −xsi (t); t > τ,
for any interior solution. This is because, since si ≤τ s′i (si <τ s′i), si cannot be
a best-reply to any x−i ∈ C−i. This, in turn, implies xˆsii = limt→∞xsii (τ)e−t =
0.
6.2 The Proofs
We are now in the position of proving propositions 1-2.
Proof of proposition 1. Denote by Θ the “inefficient” Nash equilibrium
component of game G:
Θ = {(xA, xB) ∈ ∆ : ({αs(B,A)A + (1− α)s(B,B)A })},{βs(A,A)B + (1− β)s(B,A)B })},
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with α ∈ [ vB1+vB , 1] and β ∈ [0, 1]. All strategy profiles in Θ are outcome equiv-
alent to the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (s
(B,A)
A , s
(B,A)
B ) by which the
first-best is attained in game G1 and the inefficient equilibrium is attained in
G2. To prove the proposition, it is sufficient to show that Θ is reachable from a
non-zero measure set of initial conditions. We characterize this set as follows:
Ω ≡ {(xA, xB) ∈ ∆0 : x(B,A)A > 1− ²A, x(B,A)B > 1− ²B ; 0 < ²i ≤ η, i = A,B}.
with η sufficiently small. To show that any trajectory starting from ∆0 ∩ Ω
converges to Θ, notice that, ∀x ∈ ∆0 such that x(B,A)A > v+v
B
v+vB+δ , it must
be g
(B,A)
B (x) > 0 (which implies x˙
(B,A)
B > 0), since s
(B,A)
B is the unique best
response. This, in turn, implies that, provided x
(B,A)
A (t) stays arbitrarily high,
xˆ
(B,A)
B (t) stays arbitrarily high.
By the same token, ∀x ∈ ∆0 such that x(B,A)B > 2v
A
2vA+δ , it must be g
(B,B)
A (x) >
0. Moreover, for any sequence 〈xm〉∞m=1 such that limm→∞xm = (s(B,A)A , s(B,A)B )
it must be limm→∞g
(B,B)
A (xm) > 0 since the difference in growth rates be-
tween strategy s
(B,B)
A and strategies s
(A,A)
A and s
(A,B)
A is bounded away from
zero (by monotonicity) when x
(B,A)
B is sufficiently high. This, in turn, implies
limm→∞g
(B,A)
A (xm) > 0, since (by Lipschitz continuity), |(g(B,B)A (xm)− g(B,A)A (xm))| →
0 as m → ∞. Therefore, there exists a neighborhood B¯(²B) of (s(B,A)A , s(B,A)B )
such that g
(B,A)
A (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ B¯(²B). In other words, provided x(B,A)B (t) stays
stays arbitrarily high, x
(B,A)
A (t) stays arbitrarily high. This concludes the proof.
ii). We begin by noting that s
(B,B)
A (s
(A,B)
A ) weakly dominates s
(B,A)
A (s
(A,A)
A ).
Also notice that Betta has a weakly dominant strategy, namely s
(B,B)
B . In
particular, s
(B,B)
B strictly dominates s
(A,A)
B and s
(B,A)
B and weakly dominates
s
(A,B)
B . Then, lemma 2.2 implies convergence of Betta’s mixed strategy, with
xˆ
(A,A)
B = xˆ
(B,A)
B = 0 by lemma 3. Only two cases need be discussed:
CASE 1. xˆ
(A,B)
B = 0 (i.e. xˆ
(A,B)
B = 1). This would imply s
′
A <τ s
(B,B)
A , for all
s′A 6= s(B,B)A , which in turn implies, by lemma 3, xˆ(B,B)A = 1.
CASE 2. xˆ
(A,B)
B > 0 (i.e. xˆ
(A,B)
B = 1 − xˆ(B,B)B ). This would imply, by lemma
2.2-3, xˆ
(A,A)
A = xˆ
(A,A)
A = 0 and xˆ
(B,A)
A = 1− xˆ(B,B)A .
Given that both cases imply convergence of Anna’s mixed strategy (and,
therefore, convergence to a Nash equilibrium), and that every Nash equilibrium
of game Γ is outcome equivalent to the first-best, global interior convergence
follows. As for interior asymptotic stability, the result follows directly from
lemma 1.1.
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Proof of proposition 2.
2.1 Game G.
2.1.1 Convergence Weak domination of the corresponding strategies implies, by
lemma 4,
xˆ
(A,A)
A = xˆ
(B,A)
A = xˆ
(A,A)
B = xˆ
(A,B)
B = 0.
This, in turn, implies strict τ -domination of strategies s
(A,B)
A and s
(B,A)
B
which, in turn, implies convergence to the first-best. More explicitly, since
s
(A,A)
B and s
(A,B)
B are weakly dominated (by s
(B,A)
B and s
(B,B)
B resp.), lemma 4
implies that there exists some τA ≥ 0 such that
x
(A,A)
B (t) + x
(A,B)
B (t) ≤
δ
δ + 2vA
,∀t ≥ τA.
In other words, given any interior initial condition, Anna has a strictly τ -
dominant strategy, namely s
(B,B)
A . We can evaluate τA explicitly:
τA = 0 if x
(A,A)
B (0) + x
(A,B)
B (0) ≤
δ
δ + 2vA
,
= ln(δ) − ln((x(A,A)B (0) + x(A,B)B (0))(δ + 2vA)) otherwise. (8)
By virtue of (8), τA < ∞; by lemma 4, xˆ(B,B)A = 1. Thus, there exists
some τB ≥ 0 such that x(B,B)A (t) > δ+vδ+v+vB , ∀t > τB (i.e. s
(B,B)
B also strictly
τ -dominates every other strategy in Betta’s support). Fix τ¯ = max[τA, τB ].
Since BR(x(t)) = (s
(B,B)
A , s
(B,B)
A ) for any t ≥ τ¯ , any interior solution of (3) is
characterized by the following system of differential equations:
x˙
(B,B)
i (t) = 1− x(B,B)i (t), i = A,B; (9)
for t ≥ τ¯ . Thus, xˆ(B,B)i = 1, i = A,B. This concludes the proof for game G.
2.1.2. Asymptotic Stability. Since we just defined a neighborhood of (s
(B,B)
A , s
(B,B)
A )
within which every trajectory of (2) converges monotonically to (s
(B,B)
A , s
(B,B)
A ),
the result follows.
2.2. Game Γ.
2.2.1. Convergence As we already noticed in the proof of proposition ??, in
game Γ Betta has a weakly dominant strategy, namely s
(B,B)
B . This already
implies, by lemma 4, xˆ
(B,B)
B = 1 for any interior solution of (3). By analogy
with the proof for game G, xˆ
(B,B)
B = 1 also implies xˆ
(B,B)
A = 1, since s
(B,B)
A
strictly τ-dominates every other strategy in Anna’s support.
2.2.2. Asymptotic Stability. The result follows directly from lemma 1.2.
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